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CONTINUUM NASH BARGAINING SOLUTIONS
MICAH WARREN
Abstract. Nash‘s classical bargaining solution suggests that N players in a
non-cooperative bargaining situation should find a solution that maximizes the
product of each player’s utility functions. We consider a special case: Suppose
that the players are chosen from a continuum distribution µ and suppose they
are to divide up a resource ν that is also on a continuum. The utility to
each player is determined by the exponential of a distance type function. The
maximization problem becomes an optimal transport type problem, where the
target density is the minimizer to the functional
F (β) = Hν(β) +W
2(µ, β)
where Hν(β) is the entropy and W 2 is the 2-Wasserstein distance. This
minimization problem is also solved in the Jordan-Kinderlehrer-Otto scheme.
Thanks to optimal transport theory, the solution may be described by a po-
tential that solves a fourth order nonlinear elliptic PDE, similar to Abreu’s
equation. Using the PDE, we prove solutions are smooth when the measures
have smooth positive densities.
1. Introduction
In the 1950’s [10] John Nash characterized a solution to the bargaining problem
that has since been central to the theory. Namely, the Nash bargaining solution is
the allocation that maximizes the product of the utilities to each player, over the
total space of possible allocations of a surplus. The Nash bargaining solution is
not only mathematically natural but can be achieved by strategic approaches, see
[2]. For more on the economic theory, see [9].
In this paper, we consider utility functions that are given as an integral of a
utility density function, namely
(1) Ui (νi) =
∫
Y
s(pi, y)dνi(y).
Here Y is a surplus space, X is a player space, νi is a measure on the space Y that
determines the allocation of resources to player pi ∈ X, and
s : X × Y → R+
is a utility density function. More details are found in section 2.
We begin by extending an observation of Schumacher [11] to continua. For utility
of the form
s(x, y) = e−c(x,y)
for a cost function c, Nash bargaining solutions will be optimal transport plans
between a measure µ which is known a priori, and some measure β which is de-
termined by the solution. Thus, for the purpose of maximizing the product of
The author’s work was supported in part by the NSF via DMS-1161498.
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the utility functions Ui, we need only to parameterize a space of measures on the
resource space, or equivalently, a set of Kantorivich potentials. This allows us to
do analysis in the spirit of Benamou-Carlier-Me´rigot-Oudat [1], in order to show
that discrete solutions have continuous limits.
We consider the particular case when the spaces X,Y ⊂ Rn are both convex
compact domains, players are distributed according to a probability measure µ,
and surplus is distributed according to a measure ν, both of which are absolutely
continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, and the utility density is given by
s(x, y) = e−|x−y|
2/2.
Following the arguments in [1], we find that the limit of solutions can be described
by a gradient mapping, whose potential satisfies a fourth order PDE. The problem
becomes equivalent to minimizing
(2) G(ϕ) =
∫
X
ln
(
detD2ϕ(x)
ν(∇ϕ(x))
)
dµ(x) +
1
2
∫
X
‖x−∇ϕ‖2 dµ,
which gives a fourth order nonlinear PDE similar to Abreu’s equation [5]. In
particular, the quantity detD2ϕ(x) satisfies a second order elliptic equation. In
Section 4 we show that detD2ϕ(x) is bounded and Ho¨lder continuous; from here we
can apply Caffarelli’s Schauder theory for Monge-Ampe`re equations. Smoothness
will follow by the general Schauder theory, see Section 5. The statements about
the boundedness and Ho¨lder continuity should hold more generally, for minimizers
of functionals of the form
(3) min
β∈P (Y )
{
W 2(µ, β) +
∫
Y
f
(
dβ
dν
)
dν
}
where f satisfies some convexity and other conditions.
Our main result (stated roughly for now) is as follows
Theorem 1.1. Under appropriate conditions on the measures µ, ν and for c(x, y) =
|x− y|2 /2, solutions to finite player Nash bargaining solutions converge to a con-
tinuum Nash bargaining solution.
We also have a regularity result:
Theorem 1.2. Suppose that X,Y ⊂ Rn are smooth, bounded, convex domains.
Suppose that µ and ν and smooth measure densities on X and Y respectively, that
are bounded and bounded away from zero. Then, the minimizers of the functional
(2) are smooth.
Regularity for the Jordan-Kinderlehrer-Otto Scheme on the torus was shown in
[8]. The proof of regularity in [8] for functionals of the form (2) is for small time
scales (which is sufficient to prove regularity of the JKO scheme) and assumes some
differentiability. An L∞ estimate on the densities obtained via the JKO scheme for
a general form of a parabolic-elliptic Keller-Segel type system, was shown recently
in [4]. We are able to obtain Ho¨lder estimates directly on the minimizing measures
without any assumptions of differentiability or smallness. Abreu’s equation involves
minimizing a functional of the form (2), where the gradient term is replaced by a
integral involving the potential ϕ. Details on regularity for Abreu’s equation can
be found in [7].
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2. Setup
Our goal in this section is to describe the bargaining problem in terms of mea-
sures.
Suppose that Y is any topological space, and ν is a Borel probability measure
on Y. We call the pair (Y, ν) the surplus. When there are N players vying for
portions of the surplus, we can think of the space of possible allocations of the
surplus as N -tuples of non-negative Borel measures (ν1, ..., νN ), such that
N∑
i=1
νi ≤ ν.
The function
s : X × Y → R+
is called a utility density function. The value s(x, y) gives the utility to player at
x ∈ X for a unit of y ∈ Y. As we will be integrating the density, it makes most
sense to assume the utility is linear in terms of a fixed resource y, in the sense that
the marginal utility to a player at x of a unit y is determined only by the utility
density function, and not by a function of the same or other player’s allocations.
Example 2.1. Suppose two emporers have set up capital cities at points x1 and
x2 in a region Ω ⊂ R2, and must negotiate how to split the region. Each emporer
decides that the value of any unit y of land to their kingdom is given by e−|xi−y|
2/2.
The possible allocations of the region are measures ν1, ν2 such that
ν1 + ν2 = dy|Ω.
The utility function to each is
Ui(νi) =
∫
Y
e−|xi−y|
2/2dνi(y).
Notice that in the N -player case, when the utility density is positive, pareto-
optimal solutions are a set of N measures with
∑N
i=1 νi = ν. If X = {p1, ..., pn}
and pi ∈ P (X×Y ) is a probability measure such that piY = ν ( here piY = (ProjY )#
pi, i.e. the right marginal) we may consider the measures νi = pi|{pi}×Y . In this
case, we can define the utility to each player as follows
(4) Ui (pi) =
∫
{pi}×Y
s(pi, y)dpi.
The Nash bargaining solution is determined by maximizing the Nash product,
namely
N =
N∏
i=1
Ui.
(Note that we are assuming the disagreement point is the 0-allocation, that is, all
players gets nothing when they do not agree.) Equivalently, one can maximize the
logarithm
lnN =
N∑
i=1
lnUi.
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With this in mind, for the case of N players, we define the Nash bargaining
problem as follows:
Problem 2.2. Find a measure pi that maximizes the functional
(5) F (pi) = lnN +
1
N
N∑
i=1
ln
∫
{pi}×Y
s(pi, y)dpi
over the space of measures pi ∈ P (X × Y ), under the constraint
piY = ν.
The term lnN and factor 1/N do not affect the arg max, however, they are
present for normalization reasons which will become clear when we attempt to
build a continuous solution.
2.1. Reformulating the functional. Working with (5):
F (pi) = lnN +
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
ln (pi ({pi} × Y )) + ln
(
1
pi ({pi} × Y )
∫
{pi}×Y
s(pi, y)dpi
)]
= lnN +
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
ln
(
pi ({pi} × Y )
1/N
)
+ ln(1/N) + ln
(
1
pi ({pi} × Y )
∫
{pi}×Y
s(pi, y)dpi
)]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
ln
(
pi ({pi} × Y )
1/N
)
+ ln
(
1
pi ({pi} × Y )
∫
{pi}×Y
s(pi, y)dpi
)]
.
At this point, we define a measure on X = {p1, ..., pN} as
α = piX
or equivalently,
α(pi) = pi ({pi} × Y ) .
Defining
(6) µN =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δpi
we get
F (pi) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
ln
(
α(pi)
µN (pi)
)
+ ln
(
1
α(pi)
∫
{pi}×Y
s(pi, y)dpi
)]
(7)
=
∫
X
ln
(
dα
dµN
)
dµN
dα
dα+
∫
X
AµN
where
A(pi) = ln
(
1
α(pi)
∫
{pi}×Y
s(pi, y)dpi
)
.
Note that if α(pi) = 0, then
∫
ln
(
dα
dµ
)
dµ = −∞, in which case A(pi) may be
undefined, but we agree that F (pi) = −∞.
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2.2. Solutions are Optimal Transport Plans. (Cf. [11, section 3].) Suppose
that pi is a maximizer for F, and s is a positive, continuous function. Define
c(x, y) = − ln s(x, y).
Recall that a measure pi ∈ P (X × Y ), is a solution to the optimal transportation
problem pairing the measures µ and ν, when pi minimizes∫
X×Y
c(x, y)dpi
under the constraint
piX = µ
piY = ν.
By Kantorovich duality, we have that, [12, Theorem 5.10 (iii)]
min
pi∈P (X×Y )
∫
c(x, y)dpi = max
ϕ∈L1(X,αN )
∫
Y
ϕc(y)dν −
∫
X
ϕ(x)dµ.
where ϕc is the ”cost-transform” of ϕ. This is a general fact. For many cost
functions of interest (for example c(x, y) = |x− y|2 /2) the functions ϕc and ϕ are
determined uniquely up to a constant.
Proposition 2.3. The measure pi is an optimal plan, pairing α and ν.
Proof. We proceed as in [12, proof of Theorem 5.10, step 3 on page 65]. We will
show that pi is c-cyclically monotone.
Suppose that
{(x1, y1), ..., (xn, yn)} ⊂ Supp(pi).
We would like to show that
N∑
i=1
c (xi, yi) ≤
N∑
i=1
c (xi, yi−1)
(using convention that y0 = yN ). Moving a bit of mass from (x1, y1) to (x2, y1)
will preserve the right marginal condition, but cannot increase the functional, by
maximality. Because (x1, y1) ∈ Supp(pi), there is some mass available to move.
Choose an arbitrarily small set Bε near (x1, y1) in y and consider the competing
family of measures for t ∈ [0, 1] :
pi(t) = {ν˜1(t), ν˜2(t), ν3, ..., νN}
ν˜1 = ν1 − tν1|Bε
ν˜2 = ν2 + tν1|Bε .
Clearly pi(t) is a path of admissible measures, so we can take a one-sided derivative
of (5) with respect to t :
0 ≥
dF
dt
|t=0 =
1
N
[
−
∫
{p1}×Bε
s(x1, y)dν1∫
{p1}×Y
s(x1, y)dν1
+
∫
{p1}×Bε
s(x2, y)dν1∫
{p2}×Y
s(x2, y)dν2
]
.
That is
0 ≥
[
− 1ν1(Bε)
∫
{p1}×Bε
s(x1, y1)dν1∫
{p1}×Y
s(x1, y)dν1
+
1
ν1(Bε)
∫
{p1}×Bε
s(x2, y1)dν1∫
{p2}×Y
s(x2, y)dν2
]
.
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Choosing Bε small, since s is continuous, the average values in the numerator must
converge to point values, and in the limit we see
(8)
s(x1, y1)∫
{p1}×Y
s(x1, y)dν1
≥
s(x2, y1)∫
{p2}×Y
s(x2, y)dν2
.
Then we have
ln s(x1, y1)− ln s(x2, y1) ≥ ln
∫
{p1}×Y
s(x1, y)dν1 − ln
∫
{p2}×Y
s(x2, y)dν2
or
c(x1, y1)− c(x2, y1) ≤ lnκ1 − lnκ2.
By relabeling,
c(x2, y2)− c(x3, y2) ≤ ln κ2 − lnκ3,
...
c(xN , yN)− c(x1, yN ) ≤ ln κN − lnκ1.
Summing, we have
N∑
i=1
c(xi, yi)−
N∑
i=1
c(xi, yi−1) ≤ 0.

Corollary 2.4. Suppose that
s(x, y) = e−|x−y|
2/2
and X,Y ⊂ Rn. Then the solution maximizing (5) can be described as
νi = ν|Ei
where each Ei is a Laguerre cell, defined as the subgradient of a convex function ϕ
at point xi.
We won’t prove this directly, but refer the reader to [12, Chapter 5] and [1,
Section 2]. We include a condensed recap of [1, Section 2] which will help our
discussion moving forward:
Suppose P ⊂ Rn is a finite set of points, and Y ⊂ Rn. Given a function ϕ
defined on P, define
ϕKY = max
{
ψ ∈ KY ;ψ|P ≤ ϕ|P
}
where
KY =
{
ψ∗;ψ : Y → R¯
}
is the set of functions which are Legendre-Fenchel transforms of functions on Y,
which are necessarily convex. Define
KY (P ) = {ϕ : P → R;ϕ = ϕKY |P }
and
LagϕP (p) := {y ∈ R
n; ∀q ∈ P, ϕ(q) ≥ ϕ(p) + 〈q − p|y〉} .
For normalization, we define
KY (P )0 = {ϕ ∈ KY (P );minϕ = 0} .
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Lemma 2.5. [1, Lemma 2.2] Let P be a finite point set. A function ϕ on P belongs
to KY (P ) if and only if for every p in P, the intersection Lag
ϕ
P (p)∩Y is non-empty.
Moreover, if this is the case, then
∂ϕK(p) = Lag
ϕ
P (p) ∩ Y.
2.3. Reformulating the problem again. Now that we have established that the
solution must be an optimal transport plan, we may formulate the problem over
the space of optimal transport plans. First, we need
Lemma 2.6. A maximizing solution to (5) exists, and is unique.
Proof. The constraint piY = ν is linear on the set of nonnegative probability mea-
sures, which form a compact convex set. For each i, the functional
fi =
∫
{pi}×Y
s(pi, y)dpi
is clearly linear in the measure pi. It follows that the sum of logarithms is strictly
concave. A concave function on a convex compact set achieves its maximum value,
which is unique by strict concavity. 
It is clear that the maximizing measure must be supported on P × Y : Moving
any mass from a point not in P to a point on P will increase the value of F. By
Kantorovich duality, the optimal transport plans with target ν can be parameterized
by convex functions on the set P, which is just a set of N values. The functional
can be expressed as follows.
(9) F˜N (ϕ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
ln
(
ν(Ei)
µN (pi)
)
+ ln
(
1
ν(Ei)
∫
Ei
s(pi, y)dν
)]
where
Ei = Lag
ϕ
P (pi).
We now offer a second formulation of the problem.
Problem 2.7. (Nash bargaining problem, Version 2) Maximize (9) over the space
of functions KY (P )0.
2.4. Absolutely continuous pushforward measures. Given a potential func-
tion ϕ ∈ KY (P )0, we have a Laguerre decomposition of Y. The subgradient map
is set-valued, so one cannot define the pushforward directly. However, following
[1], if we have chosen a background measure ν, we can “average” over the Laguerre
cell to define an absolutely continuous pushforward measure.
Given any decomposition of Y into cells Ei, each with positive measure, define
the following probability measure on Y : For measurable Z ⊂ Y,
(10) βϕ(Z) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ν(Ei ∩ Z)
ν(Ei)
.
In the measure pi, which is optimal between α and ν, each cell {pi}×Ei has measure
ν(Ei). By multiplying each piece by
1
N
/ν(Ei)
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we get a new measure, pi′, which has the same support as pi, but now has marginals
(pi′)X = µN
(pi′)Y = βϕ.
This means that the set-valued mapping induced by the subgradient of ϕ is an
optimal transport mapping not only between α and ν , but also between µN and
βϕ.
3. Limits of finite source solutions
Our next goal is to take a limit of solutions, when the set of points is drawn
from a distribution µ and the number of points becomes infinite. In the following
we assume that X,Y ⊂ Rn are both bounded convex regions, and that µ, ν are
probability measures on X,Y respectively, each of which are absolutely continuous
with respect to Lebesgue measure, with densities bounded away from zero. For
each N, choose a set of points PN from X and define the measure
µN =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δpi .
In the sequel we will assume that µN → µ weakly on X. By arguments in the
previous section, for each N we have
piN ∈ P (X × Y )(11)
ϕN ∈ KY (P )0
αN ∈ P (X)
βϕN ∈ P (Y )
each of which are unique and can be used to identify the solution. We will see
that when µ, ν are nice measures, all four of the objects (11) converge to limiting
objects, respectively, each of which uniquely defines a solution on the continuous
space X × Y.
Inspecting (7), note the following. The first term is the relative entropy of a
known measure µ with respect to a measure α, to be determined. The second term
is the integral of the natural log of the average of an exponential function, over a
small cell. As the size of the cells becomes smaller, one expects the average to
recover the value, and the second term will become the negative total cost of the
mass transport plan between µ and its image β under the mapping, which is also
to be determined. Under changes of measures
µ→ β
α→ ν
the first term becomes the negative relative entropy of β with respect to the measure
ν. Thus we may formulate the problem by trying to minimize the following function
over the set of probability measures on Y .
Fˆ : P (Y )→ R−
Fˆ (·) = −Hv(·)−W
2(µ, ·).(12)
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The concave functional Fˆ will have a unique maximizer on P (Y ). Define
βˆ = argmax Fˆ (·)
and choose ϕˆ such that
βˆ = (∇ϕˆ)# µ.
Our main theorem is the following.
Theorem 3.1. Let piN be a sequence of maximizers to (5), and let βN be the
associated absolutely continuous right marginals (10), Then
Fˆ (βN )→ Fˆ (βˆ).
In particular, because Fˆ is strictly concave,
βN → βˆ.
In this case, choose ϕˆ such that
βˆ = (∇ϕˆ)# µ.
We define ϕˆ as the potential solution, ∇ϕˆ as the map solution, and the measure
pi = (I ×∇ϕˆ)# µ ∈ P (X × Y ) as the measure solution of the Nash bargaining
problem.
3.1. Outline of Proof. We outline four steps, and then combine these in step 5
to get the proof. The detailed proof of steps 1-4 will appear in section 4.
Note that this result almost follows from [1, Theorem 4.1]. Instead of a pure
Wasserstein term, however, in our problem we have a term that should converge
to a Wasserstein term, provided the measures concentrate on the graph of a map.
So we must justify that indeed the maximimizers of our finite problem are indeed
concentrating on the graph of map. We reproduce some, but not all of the proof.
Step 1. The functional Fˆ has maximizer, βˆ. The density dβˆdν is bounded and
Ho¨lder continuous.
Step 2. There is a sequence of optimal transportation plans pairing µN with βˆ.
To these we can associate a function ϕˆN and an absolutely continuous measure βˆN.
Then βˆN → βˆ and Fˆ (βˆN ) → F (βˆ). The associated Laguerre cells have diameters
which go uniformly to 0.
Step 3. For the maximizers ϕN of the finite problem, we can also associate an
absolutely continuous measure βN (23). The limits of both exist, and the diameters
of the associated Laguerre cells go uniformly to 0.
Step 4. Because the diameters of the Laguerre cells go to zero, the second term
in the F˜N functional (9) (defined on ϕN or ϕˆN ) converges to the second term in in
the Fˆ functional (defined on the associated βN ). That is
(13)
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
ln
(
1
ν(Ei)
∫
Ei
s(pi, y)dν(y)
)
−W 2(µN , βN )
∣∣∣∣∣→ 0.
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It follows that ∣∣∣Fˆ (βN )− F˜N (ϕN )∣∣∣→ 0,(14) ∣∣∣Fˆ (βˆN )− F˜N (ϕˆN )∣∣∣→ 0.(15)
Step 5. Proof of Theorem. Choose ε > 0 : Because we have chosen ϕN as a
maximizer for (9) we have
(16) F˜N (ϕN ) ≥ F˜N (ϕˆN ).
Thus for N large depending on ε,
Fˆ (βN ) ≥ F˜N (ϕN )− ε by (14)
≥ F˜N (ϕˆN )− ε, by (16)
≥ Fˆ
(
βˆN
)
− 2ε, by (15)
≥ Fˆ
(
βˆ
)
− 3ε, by step 2.
Thus,
lim
N→∞
Fˆ (βN) ≥ Fˆ
(
βˆ
)
.
But Fˆ
(
βˆ
)
is the maximum. By strict concavity, it follows that βN → βˆ. Thus
β = βˆ.
4. Proof details
Unless otherwise specified, c will refer to an arbitrary cost function
c : X × Y → R
and Wc will refer to the Wasserstein distance, given the cost c. The cost c is
assumed to have global bounds and global Lipschitz bounds. The results of
Step 1 should hold for general cost c, whereas the results in Step 2 and 3 rely on
Caffarelli’s regularity theory for c = |x− y|2 /2.
Although we are most interested in the case g(u) = lnu, in Step 1 we consider a
slight generalization to functionals of the form
F (β) =
∫
Y
g(β)
dβ
dν
dν +Wc(µ, β).
4.1. Step 1. First an easy observation.
Claim 4.1. Fixing µ, suppose that β1, β2 are probability measures, and that there
is an open set O such that β1(E) = β2(E) for all measurable E ⊂ O, and β1(O) =
1− η. Then
|Wc(µ, β1)−Wc(µ, β2)| ≤ ‖c‖Lip(X×Y ) diam(O)η,
Proof. Let pi be an optimal pairing for µ, β1. We obtain a candidate transport plan
for pairing µ with β2 by shifting mass vertically along the set of size η so that the
right marginal is β2. The cost of this plan can increase at most by ‖c‖Lipdiam(Y )η.

CONTINUUM NASH BARGAINING SOLUTIONS 11
Lemma 4.2. Suppose that βˆ is the minimizer of a functional of the form
F (β) =
∫
Y
g(β)
dβ
dν
dν +Wc(µ, β)
where g is strictly increasing function,unbounded above, and
l0 = max
s∈[0,1]
[(s+ 1)g(s+ 1)− sg(s)] <∞.
Then, the density dβˆdν is bounded above, that is
βˆ(E) ≤ g−1 [l0 + osc (c)] ν(E)
for all measurable E ⊂ Y .
Note that in the case we are interested, g(u) = lnu.
Proof. First, by evaluating the functional F on the measure ν, we see
F (ν) =
∫
g(1)dν +Wc(µ, ν) < +∞.
It follows that the minimum F (βˆ) is also finite, in particular dβˆdν cannot be infinite
on a set of positive β measure, so dβˆdν exists a.e. dβ and hence a.e. dν. We can
decompose Y (a.e ν) into a countable union:
Y =
∞⋃
M=0
EM
EM =
{
y :
dβˆ
dν
(y) ∈ [M,M + 1)
}
.
Choose an M large, and assume that δ = βˆ(EM ) > 0. Let ε = ν(EM ). It follows
that ε ∈
[
δ
M+1 ,
δ
M
]
. Choose a subset E˜ ⊂ E0 such that ν(E˜) = δ (Such a set
exists by a Markov’s inequality argument for any M > 1.) By Jensen’s Inequality
(the function ug(u) is convex)∫
EM
g
(
dβˆ
dν
)
dβˆ
dν
dν = ε
∫
EM
g
(
dβˆ
dν
)
dβˆ
dν
dν
ε
≥ εg
(∫
dβˆ
dν
dν
ε
)∫
dβˆ
dν
dν
ε
= εg
(
δ
ε
)
δ
ε
= δg
(
δ
ε
)
.
Now we create a competing measure, by moving the mass from EM to E˜. That is,
dβ∗
dν
=
{
0 on EM
dβˆ
dν + χE˜ otherwise
.
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This gives another probability measure β∗. Now β∗ = βˆ except on these two small
sets, so we have
∫
Y
g
(
dβˆ
dν
)
dβˆ
dν
dν −
∫
Y
g
(
dβ∗
dν
)
dβ∗
dν
dν
=
∫
EM
g
(
dβˆ
dν
)
dβˆ
dν
dν −
∫
EM
g
(
dβ∗
dν
)
dβ∗
dν
dν +
∫
E˜
g
(
dβˆ
dν
)
dβˆ
dν
dν −
∫
E˜
g
(
dβ∗
dν
)
dβ∗
dν
dν
=
∫
EM
g
(
dβˆ
dν
)
dβˆ
dν
dν − 0 +
∫
E˜
g
(
dβˆ
dν
)
dβˆ
dν
dν −
∫
E˜
g
(
dβˆ
dν
+ 1
)(
dβˆ
dν
+ 1
)
dν
≥ δg
(
δ
ε
)
−
∫
E˜
[
g
(
dβˆ
dν
+ 1
)(
dβˆ
dν
+ 1
)
−
∫
E˜
g
(
dβˆ
dν
)
dβˆ
dν
]
dν
≥ δg
(
δ
ε
)
−
∫
E˜
l0dν = δg
(
δ
ε
)
− δl0.
That is ∫
Y
g(βˆ)
dβˆ
dν
dν +Wc(µ, βˆ)−
(∫
Y
g(β∗)
dβ∗
dν
dν +Wc(µ, β
∗)
)
≥ δ
[
g
(
δ
ε
)
− l0
]
− δosc (c)
using Claim 4.1. Now using the minimizing property of βˆ, we have
g
(
δ
ε
)
≤ l0 + osc (c) .
We conclude
M ≤ g−1 [l0 + osc (c)] .
In particular, for larger values of M, β(Em) = 0. 
Lemma 4.3. Suppose that βˆ is as in the previous Lemma and in addition that
d2
du2
(ug(u)) > 0.
Then the density dβˆdν is Ho¨lder 1/2 continuous.
Proof. Choose any point y in the interior of Y. We claim that given δ > 0, there
is an ι > 0 to be determined, such that for
(17) ε = ιδ2
we have
oscBε(y)
(
dβˆ
dν
)
< 4δ.
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Assume not. Suppose that oscBε(y)
(
dβˆ
dν
)
≥ 4δ. Let
m+ = ess sup
Bε
dβˆ
dν
m− = ess inf
Bε
dβˆ
dν
L =
m+ +m−
2
.
It follows that
ν
({
dβˆ
dν
< L− δ
}
∩Bε(y)
)
> 0
ν
({
dβˆ
dν
> L+ δ
}
∩Bε(y)
)
> 0.
Choose small η > 0 and sets E−, E+ such that ν(E−) = ν(E+) = η and
E− ⊂
{
dβˆ
dν
< L− δ
}
∩Bε(y)
E+ ⊂
{
dβˆ
dν
> L+ δ
}
∩Bε(y).
Then let
βˆ (E+) = aη
βˆ (E−) = bη
so that
a− b ≥ 2δ.
Consider the measure β∗ created by replacing βˆ with the average value of βˆ on the
sets E− and E+, namely
(18)
dβ∗
dν
=
{
a+b
2 on E− ∪ E+
dβˆ
dν otherwise
.
Now let f(u) = ug(u) and consider the quantity∫
Y
g(β)
dβ
dν
dν.
Note that
(19)
d2
du2
f(u) ≥ c0(M) > 0 for u ≤M
in particular, f is uniformly convex. By calculus,
f(a) + f(b)− 2f
(
a+ b
2
)
≥
1
4
(a− b)2 min
u∈[a,b]
f ′′(u)
≥ c0δ
2.
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Applying Jensen’s inequality on the sets E±
∫
E−
f
(
dβˆ
dν
)
dν
η
+
∫
E+
f
(
dβˆ
dν
)
dν
η
≥ f
(∫
E−
(
dβˆ
dν
)
dν
η
)
+ f
(∫
E+
(
dβˆ
dν
)
dν
η
)(20)
= f
(
1
η
∫
E−
dβˆ
)
+ f
(
1
η
∫
E+
dβˆ
)
= f (a) + f (b)
≥ 2f
(
a+ b
2
)
+ c0δ
2(21)
Now recall ν(E±) = η, (18)
(22) 2f
(
a+ b
2
)
=
∫
E−∪E+
f
(
dβ∗
dν
)
1
η
dν.
Multiplying η across (20), (21), and (22) and combining, we see.∫
E−
f
(
dβˆ
dν
)
dν +
∫
E+
f
(
dβˆ
dν
)
dν −
∫
E−∪E+
f
(
dβ∗
dν
)
dν ≥ δ2c0(M)η,
where
M =
∥∥∥∥∥dβˆdν
∥∥∥∥∥
L∞
is controlled by Lemma 4.2. Comparing with Claim 4.1, noting that the mass
moved is bounded by 2Mη, and using the maximality of βˆ, we conclude that
0 ≥ F (βˆ)− F (β∗) ≥ δ2c0(M)η − 2Mη ‖c‖Lip diam (Bε) .
Thus
δ2 ≤
2M
c0(M)
‖c‖Lip 2ε.
Revisiting our original assumption (17) , we take
ι =
c0(M)
5M ‖c‖Lip
and obtain a contradiction. Immediately we conclude that dβˆdν is C
0,1/2. 
4.2. Step 2. This is essentially [1, Steps 4 and 5, section 4]. In short: by Brenier’s
Theorem, we may find φN such that ∇φN βˆ = µN . Because µN → µ, the potentials
φN converge uniformly. It follows that the Legendre transforms ϕˆN converge
uniformly as well, to ϕˆ. If the diameter of the Laguerre cells does not shrink
to zero, there will be a line segment on which the convex potential ϕˆ is linear.
This contradicts Caffarelli’s regularity result [3], which ensures that the potential
defining the mapping between the absolutely continuous measures µ and βˆ must
be strictly convex.
Each φN defines a set of Laguerre cells {Ei} . We can define a measure:
βˆN (Z) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ν(Ei ∩ Z)
ν(Ei)
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which has the property that
∇φN βˆN = µN .
The densities dβˆNdν will converge pointwise uniformly to
dβˆ
dν , because the density
dβˆN
dν (y) is simply the average of the continuous density of
dβˆ
dν over the cell containing
y, and the cell diameters are shrinking to zero. It follows quickly that Fˆ (βˆN )→
Fˆ
(
βˆ
)
.
4.3. Step 3. For each finite player Nash bargaining problem, we choose ϕN max-
imizing (9), and obtain a set of Laguerre cells {Ei} . As before, we construct a
probability measure on Y
(23) βN (Z) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ν(Ei ∩ Z)
ν(Ei)
.
We would like to conclude these βN → β, but we do not yet have a unique limit β.
We need to use properties of βN to conclude properties of possible limits β.
Claim 4.4. The measures αN are uniformly mutually absolutely continuous with
respect to µN .
Proof. Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 2.3, we have∫
Bε
s(p1, y)dν∫
E1
s(p1, y)dν
≥
∫
Bε
s(p2, y)dν∫
E2
s(p2, y)dν
or ∫
E2
s(p2, y)dν∫
E1
s(p1, y)dν
≥
∫
Bε
s(p2, y)dν∫
Bε
s(p1, y)dν1
≥
min s(x, y)
max s(x, y)
> 0.
Similarly, ∫
E1
s(p1, y)dν∫
E2
s(p2, y)dν
≥
min s(x, y)
max s(x, y)
> 0
so also
ν(E1)
ν(E2)
≥
1
max s(x,y)
∫
Y s(p1, y)dν2
1
min s(x,y)
∫
Y
s(p2, y)dν1
>
[
min s(x, y)
max s(x, y)
]2
= a0 > 0.
This will be true for any pair, so the ratios of the measures is uniformly bounded:
(24)
a0
a0 +N − 1
≤ α(pi) ≤
1
1 + (N − 1)a0
.

Claim 4.5. The measures αN have a weak limit α which is absolutely continuous
with respect to µ. The density dα/dµ is bounded away from zero.
Proof. On the compact space X , the Wasserstein metric is compact, and equivalent
to weak topology, so there is a weak limit α. A straightforward argument in the
spirit of Littlewood’s principles using (24) shows that for all measurable E,
a0µ(E) ≤ α (E) ≤
1
a0
µ(E).

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Next we consider the convergence of ϕN . In order to extend these to X, we
denote
ϕ¯N = max
{
ψ ∈ KY : ψ|P ≤ ϕN |P
}
.
Claim 4.6. The functions ϕ¯N converge uniformly on compact subsets of X.
Proof. This follows from the fact that (KY )0 is compact: The space of convex
functions with subgradients in a bounded set is compact up to addition of a con-
stant. 
Claim 4.7. Let ϕ = lim ϕ¯N . Then
(∇ϕ)# α = ν.
Proof. We consider the dual problem (cf. [12, Theorem 5.10 (iii)]). For each N,
we have
min
pi∈P (X×Y )
piX=αN
piY=ν
∫
c(x, y)dpi = max
ϕ∈L1(X,αN )
∫
Y
ϕc(y)dν −
∫
X
ϕ(x)dαN ,
which is realized by∫
c(x, y)dpiN =
∫
Y
ϕcN (y)dν −
∫
X
ϕN (x)dαN .
Now the set of cost-transpose functions {ϕc;ϕ : X → R} is also compact up to
addition of a constant. Thus the functions ϕcN converge uniformly as well. Taking
all limits and letting pi be the weak limit of piN , we have∫
c(x, y)dpi =
∫
Y
ϕc(y)dν −
∫
X
ϕ(x)dα.
By duality, it follows that ϕ describes the optimal map between α and ν. In
particular, for c = |x− y|2 /2 we conclude that (∇ϕ)# α = ν. 
Now, we simply define
(25) β := (∇ϕ)# µ.
Despite knowing less about the regularity of β than we did for βˆ in Step 2, we
may repeat the essential portion of the argument found in [1]. Caffarelli’s strict
convexity result [3] only requires the densities are bounded and bounded away from
zero, which is true by Claim 4.4 for α and ν. We conclude that the potential ϕ is
strictly convex and that the Laguerre cells associated to ϕN must have vanishing
diameters.
4.4. Step 4. For either ϕN or ϕˆN , note that for each cell Ei the following holds
for pi and any yi ∈ Ei :∣∣∣∣s(pi, yi)− 1ν(Ei)
∫
Ei
s(pi, y)dν(y)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ oscy∈Ei s(pi, y).
The average value of the cost over any set must be larger than
b0 = e
−maxX×Y c(x,y).
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It follows immediately by the fundamental theorem of calculus that∣∣∣∣ln
(
s(pi, yi)−
1
ν(Ei)
∫
Ei
s(pi, y)dν(y)
)
− ln s(pi, yi)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1b0 oscy∈Ei s(pi, y).
Now for any set of choices of {yi ∈ Ei}
(26)∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
ln
(
1
ν(Ei)
∫
Ei
s(pi, y)dν(y)
)
−
1
N
N∑
i=1
ln s(pi, yi)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1N
N∑
i=1
1
b0
oscy∈Ei s(pi, y).
The utility function is continuous, so as the diameters of Ei shrink, so does the
right hand side of (26). On the other hand
1
N
N∑
i=1
ln s(pi, yi) = −
∫
X
c(xi, yi)dµN .
The cost function is continuous, and the values yi are being chosen from the sub-
gradient of ∇ϕN (pi), and µN → µ, so we conclude
(27) lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
ln
(
1
ν(Ei)
∫
Ei
s(pi, y)dν
)
= −
∫
X
c(x,∇ϕ(x))dµ(x).
This proves the first claim in Step 4.
Next, note that
−Hν(βN ) = −
N∑
i=1
∫
Ei
ln
(
1
N
/ν(Ei)
)
1
N
/ν(Ei)dν
= −
N∑
i=1
ln
(
1
N
/ν(Ei)
)
1
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
ln
(
ν(Ei)
µN (pi)
)
.(28)
Thus, using (27),(25), recalling (12), and (9)
lim
N→∞
(
F˜N (ϕN )− Fˆ (βN )
)
= lim
N→∞
(
1
N
ln
(
1
ν(Ei)
∫
Ei
s(pi, y)dν
)
+W 2(µ, βN )
)
= −
∫
c(x,∇ϕ(x))dµ + lim
N→∞
W 2(µ, βN )
= −W 2(µ, (∇ϕ)# µ) +W
2(µ, β)
= 0.
This proves (14). A nearly identical argument proves (15).
5. A Fourth Order PDE and smoothness of solutions
In this section we argue that the function ϕ satisfies an elliptic quasilinear fourth
order PDE and enjoys derivative estimates of all orders.
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Given a smooth probability measure µ on X, one can parameterize the space of
probability measures on Y by convex potentials ϕ on X : For any β, we can solve
the optimal transportation problem pairing µ with β, obtaining ϕ such that
(29) β = (∇ϕ)# µ.
On the other hand, for any convex ϕ the subgradient mapping defines a probability
measure via (29). Using this, we can insert ϕ into the functional Fˆ :
Fˆ (ϕ) = −
∫
Y
ln
(
dβ
dν
(y)
)
dβ
dν
(y)dν(y)−
1
2
∫
X
‖x−∇ϕ(x)‖2 dµ(x).
= −
∫
Y
ln
(
dβ
dν
(y)
)
dβ(y) −
1
2
∫
X
‖x−∇ϕ(x)‖2 dµ(x).
Now ∇ϕ is a change of measure, so
Fˆ (ϕ) = −
∫
X
ln
(
dβ
dν
(∇ϕ(x))
)
dµ(x) −
1
2
∫
X
‖x−∇ϕ(x)‖2 dµ(x)
= −
∫
X
ln
(
µ(x)
det(D2ϕ(x))ν(∇ϕ(x))
)
dµ(x) −
1
2
∫
X
‖x−∇ϕ(x)‖2 dµ(x).
= −
∫
X
[
lnµ(x) − ln det(D2ϕ(x)) − ln ν(∇ϕ(x))
]
dµ(x)−
1
2
∫
X
‖x−∇ϕ(x)‖2 dµ(x).
Now consider a compactly supported variation:
ϕt = ϕ(x) + tη(x)
for some compactly supported smooth test function η. We compute
dFˆ (ϕt)
dt
|t=0 = −
∫
X
[
−ϕijηij −
1
ν(∇ϕ)
∇ν(∇ϕ) · ∇η
]
dµ−
∫
X
(x−∇ϕ) · ∇ηdµ
=
∫
X
{
∂i∂j
(
µϕij
)
+ div
(
−µ
1
ν(∇ϕ)
∇ν(∇ϕ) + µ (x−∇ϕ)
)}
ηdx.
Here ϕij is the inverse of the Hessian matrix ϕij . Now if the measure β = (∇ϕ)# µ
is a maximizer, any compactly supported variation will not change the functional
to first order, so we have an Euler-Lagrange equation:
∂i∂j
(
µϕij
)
+ div
(
µ
1
ν(∇ϕ(x))
∇ν(∇ϕ(x)) + µ (x−∇ϕ)
)
= 0.
This becomes an equation on det(D2ϕ(x)) : Write the first term as
∂i∂j
(
µϕij
)
= ∂i∂j
(
µ
Cijϕ
detD2ϕ(x)
)
where
Cijϕ = detD
2ϕ(x)ϕij
is the (divergence-free) cofactor matrix. We see
∂i∂j
(
µϕij
)
= L
(
µ(x)
detD2ϕ(x)
)
where
L = Cij∂i∂j
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the equation becomes
(30) L
(
µ(x)
detD2ϕ(x)
)
= div
(
µ(x)
1
ν(∇ϕ(x))
∇ν(∇ϕ(x)) − µ(x) (x−∇ϕ(x))
)
.
Now we determined in Lemma 4.3 that the density dβˆdν must be Ho¨lder continuous.
It follows that the potential ϕ satisfying
det(D2ϕ(x)) =
µ(x)
βˆ(∇ϕ(x))
will be C2,α, with estimates on any interior set [3]. In particular, the cofactor
matrix defining L is uniformly elliptic. Thus the equation (30) is uniformly elliptic
with Ho¨lder coefficients. Also note that because ϕ ∈ C2,α, the right hand side of
(30) is C0,α. Thus we can apply the classical Schauder theory [6, Theorem 6.19] and
conclude that detD2ϕ(x) is itself C2,α. Repeating these two steps gives estimates
of arbitrarily high order.
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